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My present study puts under light the intrinsic tie that 
connects self, history and art. This triad enhances me to raise the 
following questions: How do we write? What do we write? Are 
we only containers within/through which thoughts think and 
express themselves? Or, are we conscious of what we write, and 
therefore, what is outlined and reproduced is no more than a 
presentation of history, and one’s history in art? 
For the critic Paul John Eakin, one’s self-history, i.e. auto-
biography, is the raw material of one’s artistic expression. He 
writes: “Autobiography is a man’s very sense of his own personal 
identity” (1985: 132). In the same vein, Virginia Woolf maintains 
that it is otherness in one’s own identity, which writes and 
expresses itself beyond the realm of physicality. She states: “It is a 
mistake to think that literature can be produced from the raw. One 
get out of life [....] One must become externalised; [....] When I 
write I’m merely a sensibility” (1981: 193). The critic Mark Bevir 
extends further pointing out the importance of the mind in mining 
within the self and rendering the hidden regions that are, directly or 
indirectly, accumulated by the sediments of one’s past history. He 
extends: Because the content of a work is given by the mental 
activity of its author, the content of a text at any moment in time is 
defined by the mental activity of those individuals who have 
associated works with it. In a sense, therefore, to study the meaning 
of a text is always to study authorial intention. (2002: 508) 
We understand by ‘authorial intention’, the presence of the 
author in his work. That is, the author keeps himself within his 
work. He is everywhere and seen nowhere. “The 
autobiographer,” Avrom Fleishman points out, “keeps his life 
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vividly present; otherwise the events become recoverable only by 
the act of resuscitation known as biography” (1983: 06). 
Autobiography makes life contemporaneous. Such 
contemporaneousness makes autobiography ever-unfinished and 
timeless. In the preface to his book, Metaphors of Self: The 
Meaning of Autobiography, James Olney writes: “It is in my 
opinion that, though it treats often specific places and times and 
individuals, and must do so to make its experience real  
autobiography is more universal than it is local, more timeless 
than historic, and more poetic in its significance than merely 
personal” (1972: viii). 
Autobiography universalizes the local, poeticizes the 
historical and gives personal significance to places and spaces, to 
events and movements. In other words, the artist produces his 
own reality on the basis of facts. Fleishman maintains that: “[It 
is] the literalist or purist position, which maintains that an 
autobiography is a self-written biography designed and required 
to impart verifiable information about the historical subject” 
(1983: 07). He extends further claiming that any act of writing is 
a project of writing where the author intentionally creates his 
world within this world. “The intention to tell the truth about 
oneself, like other imaginative projects,” Fleishman points      
out, “is a fictional premise which may issue in highly rewarding 
constructions of the self” (10).  
Artistic manifestation is rooted within personal production. 
That is to say, it is the abstraction of the concrete—the object of 
the subject.  Paul De Man compares art to lightning. He explains: 
“Lightning cannot be said to be hidden before its    
manifestation, but rather it expresses itself (if the word still 
applies) fully in the instant of its illumination” (1982: XX). 
Besides, he considers art as a representation: the manifestation of 
the within in the without. He states: “It is the distinctive privilege 
of language to be able to hide meaning behind misleading      
sign, as when we hide rage or hatred behind a smile.” (11) 
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The order of autobiography is in no way the order of history. 
History is beyond us: we experiment it, or we are driven by its 
events, whereas autobiography is frequently a conscious 
reconstruction of such events from within history. Thus, the 
events of history within a work of art are ‘transgressed’ 
fragments orchestrated in a special structure that better fits the 
artistic end, which could be that of the author or just become that 
of art itself. Fleishman maintains that: “The auto- biographer 
gives an order to the facts of his history, an order not inherent in 
them but necessarily of his own devising” (1983: 11). 
Questing the meaning of life in art is dialogically based on the 
meaning of life within autobiography. It is neither the          
event, which is the aim, but the meaning of life within this event  
which is significant in autobiography. In the terms of Fleishman: 
“The object represented in an autobiography would be neither 
entities nor events but the life itself. [It is] the creation of a new 
being, a life—not one to take up space and people the          
earth, perhaps, but one that exists as an aesthetic object” (13). 
And so, two dialogical elements emerge: fact and fiction. The 
former is the common; the latter is the uncommon.    
Furthermore, the writer assumes to tell the truth and nothing than 
the truth. That is, he does acknowledge his presence through 
signature. In Philippe Lejeune’s sense, he signs his name. The 
reader considers himself as a truth founder whatever the text is. 
He believes in what the artist tells. In other words, the reader 
trusts the artist. Lejeune’s ‘pacte’, which denotes the 
conventional understanding between writer and reader, is 
problematic! “Whether or not,” Bruss points out, “what is 
reported can be discredited; then autobiographer purports to 
believe in what he asserts” (1975: 11).  
Aesthetic construction of a novel is based on manipulation. 
The latter makes the author recreate life out of life—out of the 
fragments of his own experience and blows some spiritual 
intensity within this creation. He makes, thus, his text 
autonomous: it is his, yet, not his own; it is from him, yet, not for 
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him; it is a new born creation, which holds its own self-
referentiality. “Any text is inevitably an emanation of its author 
so that it reveals uniqueness by a natural process even without 
his intended or executed design to do so” (Fleishman 1983: 19).  
Writers recycle their memories through art: they create what 
they do not have in reality.  They recreate their own past in order to 
look at it with a different lens. Recreation makes autobiography a 
kind of arrangement of the author’s past through his own pure 
imagination. Thus, what is written is less realistic and more 
fictitious. “Through the processes of mediation (by linguistic 
reality) and suspension (due to the text’s lack of finality of 
completion),” Robert Elbaz assumes, “autobiography can only be 
fiction: both are narrative arrangements of reality” (1988: 01). 
Elbaz goes further claiming that the self is timeless and      
spaceless, and the self of the past is not the self of the present. He 
writes: “Since I am not myself, I am not the same person I was 
yesterday or ten years ago, given my relational nature, I cannot be 
writing my autobiography but the story of a variety of old 
‘personae’ seen from a distance” (12). Elbaz’s position keeps pace 
with Jacques Lacan, who associates the matter of representation 
with whom he speaks: which self that writes; which self that 
thinks? He says: “It is not a question of knowing whether I am 
speaking about myself in conformity with what I am, but rather that 
of knowing whether, when I speak of it, I am the same as that of 
which I speak…” (Fleishman 1983: 33). 
This point of ‘who speaks’ is also raised by Lejeune, who 
under- lines the interference or clashes between the 
author/narrator/character. He writes: “En effet, en faisant 
intervenir le problème de l’auteur, l’autobiographie met en 
lumière des phénomènes que la fiction laisse dans l’indécision : 
en particulier le fait qu’il faut très bien y avoir identité du 
narrateur et du personnage dans le cas du récit ‘à la troisième 
personne’” (1975 : 16). Paul John Eakin claims that the reality 
you have in the novel is an artistic reality, whose bases are facts. 
He says: “It is reasonable to assume that all autobiography has 
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some fiction in it, as it is to recognize that all fiction is in some 
sense necessarily autobiographical” (1985: 10). 
The linguist Emile Benveniste associates speech to identity 
and reality to discourse.  For him, reality of discourse is a reality 
in its uniqueness. He writes: 
What then is the reality to which ‘I’ or ‘You’ refers to?  It is 
solely ‘reality of discourse’ and this is a very strange thing. ‘I’ 
cannot be defined except in terms of ‘locution’, not in terms of 
objects as a nominal sign is. ‘I’ signifies ‘the person who is 
uttering the present instance of the discourse ‘I’. This instance is 
unique by definition and has validity only in its uniqueness. 
(1974: 218) 
Identity is both extroversive and intraversive. It is similar to light 
spectrum: it is one, yet, fragmented. Light holds many colours, and 
so is identity: it holds many selves. At least four, according to Paul 
De Man: “1-the self that judges; 2-the self that reads; 3-the self that 
writes; 4-the self that reads itself” (1982: 32). 
So, which self that writes autobiography? The critic Leigh 
Gilmore is intrigued by the problem of referentiality in 
autobiography. He states that: “The autobiographical code of 
referentiality, in construct, deploys the illusion that there is a 
single ‘I’, sufficiently distinct from the ‘I’ it narrates to know it 
as well as to see it from the vantage of experience and still, more 
problematically, to be that ‘I’” (1998: 60).   
Both literary critics, Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, give us 
a clear example of how women authenticate themselves within 
their autobiography. The ‘I’ used by them is no longer the real 
culturally defined ‘I’ but an ‘I’ of their own. They employ 
understatement to mask their intentions. “Even as the 
autobiographical act gesture toward a desire for ‘the self’ and 
‘self-image’ to ‘coincide’, the act, especially for women who 
‘question’ the authority of the Law of the Father,” points out 
Smith and Watson “leads not to the inscription of a unitary self 
but to the self decentred or elided by ‘the fissures of female 
discontinuity’” (1998: 20-1). In other words, women develop a 
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kind of dual consciousness between the culturally prescribed self 
and a self that comes from the deep insights of the within. “In 
life,” the critic Wayne C. Booth states, “we never know anyone 
but ourselves by thoroughly reliable internal signs, and most of 
us achieve an all too partial view even of ourselves” (1991: 03). 
And so is in fiction: we never know anyone but ourselves. We 
reconstruct a world out of the relics of words and expressions of 
the artist. Albert Einstein rightly claims that: 
Man tries to make himself in the fashion that suits him best, a 
simplified and intelligible picture of the world; he then tries to 
some extent to substitute this cosmos of his for the world of 
experience, and thus to overcome it.  This is what the painter, the 
poet, the speculative philosopher, and the natural scientist do, 
each in his own fashion. Each makes this cosmos and its 
construction the pivot of his emotional life, in order to find in the 
way the peace and security which he cannot find in the narrow 
whirlpool of personal experience. (1962: 225) 
So, the author’s presence is always inside his creation, yet 
undetectable. “We must not forget,” Booth asserts, “that though 
the author can to some extent choose his disguises, he can never 
choose to disappear” (1991: 20). Rhetorical illusions are only a 
kind of disguise and elusiveness of the artist.  
Is this disguise a means to resist the reader and refuse to tell 
him the truth about one’s history, or whatever you say is devoid 
of truth? Commenting upon poets in his ideal city         
Republic, Aristotle considers “utterances as devoid of sense” 
(1975: 1404). The sense is ‘What is’, but the poet’s utterances 
(as poiesis, epos and muthos) are ‘what is not.’ In C. Jan 
Swearingen’s terms, “The poets’stories were made up, and 
thereby not true” (1990: 182). So, poets are making of ‘what is’ 
‘what is not’—a world of their own within the world of ours. In 
his book Personality, The philosopher and literary critic Tagore 
Rabindranath writes:  
It is almost a truism to say that the world is what we perceive 
it to be.  We imagine that our mind is a mirror, that it is more or 
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less accurately reflecting what is happening outside. On the 
contrary, our mind itself is the principal element of creation. The 
world, while I am perceiving (sic) it, is being incessantly created 
for myself—time and space. (1953: 47) 
A change, a metamorphosis, is an act of aesthetic creation. I 
mean: to write is to become an ‘Other’. You become what you 
are not. M. M. Bakhtin maintains that: “Metamorphosis serves as 
other basis for a method of portraying the whole of an 
individual’s life in its more important moments of crisis: for 
showing how an individual becomes other than what he was” 
(1992: 115).  
Language makes up the self; it recreates it. The self vibrates 
and manifests through and within language. Eakin points out 
that: “It is through language and the development of imagination 
in language that man achieves the self-reflexive dimension of 
consciousness that distinguishes his mental life from the 
conscious experience of the other animals” (1985: 193). On the 
other hand, language displays realities on the self and its diverse 
intentions. The critic Elizabeth W. Bruss states that: The 
structure of autobiography, a story that is at once by and about 
the same individual, echoes and reinforces a structure already 
implicit in our language, a structure that is also (not 
accidentally) very like what we usually take to be the structure of 
self-consciousness itself: the capacity to know and 
simultaneously be that which one knows. [...] Indeed to be a 
‘self’ at all seems to demand that one displays the reality to 
embrace, take in, one’s own attributes, and activities—which is 
just the art of display that language makes possible. (1980: 301) 
The self is held within speech. Thus, it controls the metaphors 
and the symbols with and within which it manifests. As the 
author writes, “he creates not simply an ideal, impersonal ‘man 
in general’ but an implied version of ‘himself’ that is different 
from the implied authors we meet in other men’s works. To some 
novelists it has seemed, indeed, that they were discovering or 
creating themselves as they wrote” (Booth 1991: 70-1). So, the 
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authorial manifestations are within the point of view. Whatever 
is its nature, this viewpoint is tinged and coloured with some 
touches of the author. In the words of Bakhtin: “Behind the 
narrator’s story we read a second story, the author’s story; he is 
the one who tells us how the narrator tells stories, and also tells 
us about the narrator himself” (1992: 313-14). 
The author tailors, with his aesthetic stitches, the rags and 
fragments of his own past experiences. He harmonizes and 
orders them in the way he wants. Yet, he remains within his 
design. Paul Jay maintains that: “The idea here that selfhood is a 
product of labor, that we continuously ‘thatch’ ourselves 
together anew out of ‘shreds’ and ‘tatters’, turn the activities of 
both the tailor and the editor into metaphors of being” (1984: 
104). Jay gives us the example of James Joyce, who has made 
Stephen represent the other self that he wants to be but he is not.  
Thus, the novel reproduces the past he refuses and opts for 
another self through Stephen: “If Portrait is autobiographical, it 
is autobiographical in just this way: Joyce’s creation of Stephen 
represents a putting to death of his own past and his own past 
self, and yet all the same time it represents his rebirth as an 
artist” (1982: 144). Jay’s point is akin to Roland Barthes’s claim 
of the impossibility to restore the whole of the past into fiction. 
Barthes writes: “I do not try to restore myself…. I do not say: ‘I 
am going to describe myself’ but: ‘I am writing a text, and I call 
it R. B.’… I am the story which happens to me” (1977: 56). He 
then adds: “What I write about myself is never the last word: the 
more ‘sincere’ I am, the more interpretable I am, under the eye 
of other examples than those of the old authors, who believed 
they were required to submit themselves to one law: 
Authenticity” (120). 
There is, thus, confusion in representation: who speaks? Who 
reproduces whom? Is the ‘I’ my real ‘I’ or just an ‘I’less ‘I’-
selfless ‘I’-or just an impersonal ‘I’ that represents another ‘He’ 
that is a part of me, and that I ignore? Bakhtin raises such dual in 
his Dialogism. He writes:   
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I acknowledge myself, an image that is my own, but on this 
distanced plane of memory such a consciousness of self is 
alienated from ‘me’. I see myself through the eyes of another.  
This coincidence of forms—the view I have of myself as self, and 
the view I have of myself as other—bears an integral, and 
therefore naïve, character—there is no gap between the two—
We have as yet no confession, no exposing of self.  The one doing 
the depicting coincides with the one being depicted. (1992: 34) 
And then, how can we depict or describe or report a past 
history of a self that we fail to detect: it does exist, yet ever-
absent. It is in everything, yet, absent from everything! Olney 
describes such paradox as follows:  
It [Self] bears no definition; it squirts like mercury away from 
observation; it is not known except privately and intuitively; it is 
for each of us, only itself, unlike anything else experienced or 
experienceable. And yet, the man who commits himself to the 
whole task of autobiographer intends to make this self the 
subject of his book and to import some sense of it to the reader 
(1972: 24). 
The style is said to be the man (Comte Duffon). It holds some 
imprints and touches of its maker. “The self,” Olney maintains  
“expresses itself by the metaphors it creates and projects, and we 
know it by those metaphors; but it did not exist as it now does 
and as it now is before creating its metaphor” (1972: 34). In the 
words of Eric B. Williams: “Language was thus never the 
product of nature but rather a medium of inward reflection and 
revelation (offenbarung)” (1993: 60).  
So, writing is being/becoming an ‘Other’; it is creating 
oneself through art. And so, the author remains historically 
alienated and undetectable in this ever-being new. This position 
is closely related to Susan Stanford Freidman, who assumes that: 
“Alienation is not the result of creating a self in language; 
instead, alienation from the historically imposed image of the 
self is what motivates the writing, the creation of an alternative 
self in the autobiographical act” (1988: 76). 
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So, truth cannot be grasped in artistic creation; yet, it does 
exist somewhere within the discourse. The critic William           
H. Grass points out that: “Truth, I am convinced, has antipathy 
for art.[….] It is best when a writer has a deep and abiding 
indifference to it, although as a private person it may be vital to 
him” (1971: 08). Grass adds that: “The worlds which the writer 
creates are only imaginatively possible ones, they need not be at 
all like any real one, and the metaphysics any fiction implies is 
likely to be meaningless or false if taken as nature’s own” (9-10). 
Language is suggestive, and its suggestiveness makes its 
signifier hold many signifieds. Thus, interpretation becomes very 
personal. Furthermore, the author is not systematic and 
straightforward in his creative text: he says what he does not 
mean. He uses figures of speech and the like. J. Hillis Miller 
draws attention to such complexity and claims that: “Irony is 
truth telling or a means of truth telling, of unveiling. At the same 
time, it is a defence against the truth. This doubleness makes     
it, though it seems so coolly reasonable, another mode of 
unreason, the unreason of a fundamental undecidability” (1985: 
48-9). In the same vein, William Righter adds: “To represent 
something was to become the mask for a truth, either occult or 
abstract. So, myth became the subject of allegorical 
interpretation, which, in turn, was rationalized with more and 
more complexity.” (1975: 08). 
Seemingly, art tends to be self-referential: history and facts 
are only a means but never an end. Facts of fiction are facts in 
fiction. They seem realistic, but they are ‘out there’ in a world of 
never-never-time and never-never-space. Rajchman points out: 
“Art turns to its basic means and materials; the artist’s act or 
gesture is addressed to no one and has no other warrant or 
function than itself. In some such sense, modernist works are 
said to be self-questioning” (1985: 13). 
In conclusion, I would say: any creative artist, whether in 
painting, or writing or acting is present in his creative act. The 
artist creates life through the imaginative transformations of fact.  
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Autobiography, thus, is self-realisation within the scope of art. 
As a reader, I see the author’s mind in his work, and his work is 
more than the fragments of the past—his past. But if the work is 
a mirror, it does not reflect the artist; it reflects the person, who 
looks at it—the reader!   
Then, is truth ‘found’ or ‘created’? That is the question! 
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